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T

HE "Warsaw" Sub-Committee, which in 1951 was established by
the Legal Committee of ICAO for the revision of the Convention
of Warsaw,' drafted in January 1952 a new text of a convention "for
the unification of rules relating to liability of the carrier in international carriage by air," which in Article 25 contains the following
provision:
"Contracting States shall co-operate to secure, as far as possible, a uniform interpretation of this Convention."
The present Warsaw Convention does not contain a similar provision,
nor do the other air law Conventions.
The desirability of uniform interpretation of the international
conventions for the unification of private law does not need much
arguing. Only those who think that a good law will always offer clear
and simple answers when applied to any fact situation which may arise
under it-if such persons have ever existed-might feel that the question
of uniform interpretation is of little importance for the primary purpose
of the private law conventions: unification of the law.
Even if one steers far away from the extreme point of view taken
by some adherents of the realistic school with respect to the judge's
task, no modern student of law can deny the creative element in
judicial activity. Nor is it still possible to maintain that that element
could be reduced to nil by a regular revision of the law. There may
exist a difference of views as to where the realm of the judge in moulding the law to the body of real life ends, and where the task of the
legislator begins, but in view of the necessarily slow movement of the
legislative organs, it is difficult to maintain that by periodical revision
of the law the needs of society for certainty and uniformity could be
satisfied. This is even more true when speaking of international conventions which, with the necessity of diplomatic conferences and ratifications, need a much longer period of gestation. It is probably not too
pessimistic and, as soon as major problems are involved, rather too
optimistic to say that a period of eight years is the minimum time
needed for elaborating a revised convention and having it signed and
I Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air, signed at Warsaw on the 12th of October, 1929.
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ratified by a sufficient number of States. A revision which touches upon
major principles, such as the revision of the Warsaw Convention now
undertaken by the Legal Committee of ICAO, will even under the
most favorable circumstances probably not come into effect much
earlier than 1960.2
That the various private air law conventions are open to multiple
interpretations on a number of points can hardly be denied. The
fact that the instances where courts of different countries have adopted
different views with respect to specific provisions of the private air law
conventions, so far have been rare, should not lead one to think that
these conventions offer little opportunity for different interpretations.
The truth is rather that for obvious reasons the airlines generally prefer
to settle their disputes out of court, especially where the question turns
on a purely legal point. But that does not mean that the need for
certainty and uniformity would not be as great as is the case where the
decision of a court is actually asked for.
The Warsaw Sub-Committee which adopted the above quoted text
of Article 25 certainly can not be accused of having made a too ambitious approach to this important problem. The solution it proposes,
if solution it can be called, is merely an appeal to the various contracting states to promote uniform interpretation "as much as possible."
In view of the well known lack of interest of many judges and practising
lawyers as regards anything foreign to their own legal system, often
combined with a comfortable superiority complex, such appeal is certainly not superfluous. It may be feared, however, that the suggested
text if it is not corroborated by some practical device for promoting
uniform interpretation, will remain a pious vow.
The proposed wording apparently should not be taken too literally,
in a sense that the Contracting States actually should ensure uniform
interpretation by instructing their courts that where a certain interpretation of some provision has been adopted by a foreign jurisdiction
such interpretation should always be followed. There is no doubt that
such action would be "possible" but it is also obvious that no State
would be willing to go that far. Therefore, "as far as possible" should
be taken in the colloquial sense amounting to: "do what you can," with
the mental reservation that one is allowed to take into account one's
own desires and prejudices.
The footnote which the Sub-Committee has added to this provision
states that "the Sub-Committee considered the desirability of inserting
another paragraph in this article to provide for the submission of
questions of interpretation of this Convention to the International
Court of Justice, through the Council of ICAO, since some members of
the Sub-Committee thought that such a system might facilitate uniform
2 Cf. The report of G. Gidel for the 1936 meeting of the Institute of Inter-

national Law "La Clause Jurisdietionelle Dans les Conventions d'Union Notam-

ment Cellas Relatives A la Propri~t6 Industrielle et i la Propridt6 Artistique. et
Litt6raire," 39 Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit International (Bruxelles 1936) I
246 at 262.
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interpretation of the Convention. The majority, however, considered
that such a provision would have little, if any, value because it is unlikely that cases arising under this Convention would become the
subject of disputes between States."
In order to prevent the solution discussed at Paris from being forgotten 8 before its merits have been seudied more thoroughly than it
was possible to do on that occasion, the possibility of asking advisory
opinions of the Court of International Justice on the interpretation
of private air law Conventions will be studied in the present paper.
Before doing so it may be useful, however, to offer a short survey
of the earlier attempts which have been made in this connection, and
of some solutions suggested in this and in related fields.
CITEJA
In 1933 the Third International Conference on Air Law in Rome
4
which established the texts of two private air law Conventions
prompted by a French proposal, adopted the following resolution:
PROPOSALS OF

"The Conference---considering the interest for all users of aviation from time to time to be enlightened on the texts established
by the International Conferences on Private Air Law-requests
the CITEJA (Comit6 International Technique d'Experts Juridiques A6riens) to examine, in view of the Fourth Conference on
Private Air Law, if, to what extent and in what manner, it may
offer its advice on the interpretation of the texts made by the International Conventions of Private Air Law, in case it will be requested to do so by a public Administration or an international
organization, without affecting the rights of the judiciary seized
of a dispute."
The First Commission of the CITEJA, following this request, worked
out a draft 5 which after first having been adopted almost unanimously,
was afterwards rejected by a small majority, so that Mr. Lapradelle, in
1939, had to report to the full Committee that in view of certain
objections it was premature to hope for a speedy adoption of a text
concerning the interpretation by the CITEJA of the air law Conventions. 6
The question was again taken up after the war, when the First
Commission adopted with some slight amendments the proposals of
the Reporter Mr. Charlier. These proposals, if adopted, would have
granted to the CITEJA the power to give advisory opinions on the
s No formal minutes of the Meetings of the Warsaw Sub-Committee have
been made.
4 The "Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Damages Caused by Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface," and the "Convention
for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the Attachment of Aircraft."
5 The discussions on this subject can be found in the minutes ("comptes
rendus") of the 1934, 1936, 1937 and 1938 meetings of the First Commission of

the CITEJA (Documents 239, 298, 334 and 362).

6A review of the prewar discussions and papers of the CITEJA on the
problem can be found in The Reports to the First Commission of the CITEJA
by De Lapradelle (1937 Doc. Nr. 286 reprinted in Doc. 298) and by Charlier

(1946, Doc. nr. 487).
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interpretation of international air law provisions, if requested to do so
by any State, any international body, any interested public authority
or any interested person. Such opinions would be only advisory and
would have no binding force. The proposals were not discussed in
the last full (Cairo) meeting of the CITEJA, nor has the problem of
interpretation been on the agenda of the Legal Committee of ICAO
which in 1947 took the place of the CITEJA.
The principle of interpretation by the CITEJA was felt by the
American and English delegates as an encroachment on the functions
of either the diplomatic conference which alone would have the power
to give an authoritative interpretation of international conventions, or
of the judge who alone could take into account the facts and needs of
each situation when applying the international rules. The English
delegate, moreover, objected on account of the British views as to the
irrelevance of the drafting history when construing legal texts,7 and
the American delegate stressed the American prejudice against "advisory opinions" generally.8
The question of whether the CITEJA was an appropriate agency
for construing the private air law conventions which it had itself prepared is now only of historical value, as this permanent Committee of
experts was liquidated in 1946 and replaced by a Committee of national delegations, functioning ,as a Legal Committee of the International Civil Aviation Organization.
One of the main arguments for making use of the CITEJA for the
interpretation of the private air law conventions had been CITEJA's
inside knowledge of the drafting of these texts. It might, therefore, be
supposed to be in the best position for determining what they meant.
This argument had been answered before the war by the fact that
even at that time two of the experts who had taken an active part in
the drafting of the Warsaw Convention were not on the Committee
anymore. In view of the different organization of the Legal Committee
which is no longer primarily a group of experts taken from various
countries, but a permanent conference of national delegations speaking
for their respective governments, the continuity of its members is even
less guaranteed than with the CITEJA. Moreover, it must be doubted
whether the. persons who have taken part in the preparation of legal
texts are most fit to construe these texts, once they are to be applied
to often unforeseen situations.9
However that may be, few people will find that the Legal ComTCITEJA, Compte rendu des R6unions de la Premibre Commission, Berlin
1934, Document No. 239, p. 26.
s CITEJA, Observations de la D6lgation Am~ricaine sur l'interpr~tation
des Conventions. 1936, Document No. 293.
9Cf. The remark by the Dutch Delegate at the meeting of the First Commission in Berlin, 1934: "ni l'organisme qui a pr~par6, ni P'organisme qui a
arrgt6 une r~gle, ne doivent 6tre qualifi6s pour en donner une interpr6tation.
Il n'est pas bon s'il se produit un certain flottement sur l'interpr~tation d'un
mot ou d'une phrase, que cet organisme ait Pair d'un juge, c'est.h-dire donne
son opinion sur la signification exacte d'une certaine orientation." (CITEJA,
Document No. 239, p. 19.)
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mittee of ICAO would be an appropriate body for a more or less
authoritative interpretation of air law conventions. The Committee
being composed of delegations having mandates from their countries,
its members certainly do not have the independent status desirable for
this quasi-judicial activity. Also it is too large and unwieldy for the
kind of discussion which would be required, leaving aside the difficulties created by the fact that three languages are spoken by its members.
Finally it is not unfair to say that the Legal Committee, especially after
it has willingly accepted a more dependent position in regard to the
Council of ICAO, has not the authority necessary to give its interpretation the desired unifying effect. This does not amount to saying that
the Committee could not play a useful part in the promotion of uniform
interpretation, as will be suggested below.
WORLD AIR LAW

COURT

The ideal solution probably would be to create an international
Air Law Court, to which parties could appeal from decisions of national
courts, and which thus could play the unifying part of a World Supreme
Court on air law. The creation of an international private law court
to which private parties would have access has frequently been advocated. 10 At the 38th Conference of the International Law Association
(Budapest, 1934) a formal proposal to that effect was made by Professor de Lapradelle.1 More limited ratione materiae was the proposal
worked out by the Reporters E. Roguin and A. Darras to the 1895 and
1897 Conferences of the International Law Institute ("Institut de
Droit International") .12 This proposal provided for International
Tribunals for the interpretation of the "conventions internationales
d'union," such as the Berne Conventions on copyright, industrial
property and continental railways, and the postal union conventions.
It has never been discussed and the subject was dropped by the Institute
for some 36 years. 18
A far less ambitious project has been suggested by Professor Cleveringa in a report to the second Conference of The International Bar
Association. 14 In view of the strong resistance against creating a private
law court which would rank above the courts of sovereign states, Professor Cleveringa thinks that the first step to be made should not go
further than the creation of a standing court of arbitration to which
parties could, of their own free will and in common agreement, submit
any dispute in the field of maritime and air law. An award by this
10'Cf. Ch. Carabiber, les jurisdictions internationales de droit priv6.
Neuchatel, 1947, especially pp. 297-309. Also the Report by Gidel. (See note 2)
pp. 265 to 279.
11 Report of the Conference at p. 71-75.
12Annuaire 1895 and 1897 (XVI) 106.108.
18 Cf. Gidel (I.e. see note 2) at 248.
14 R. P. Cleveringa, An International Maritime and Aeronautic Law Court,
2d Conference of The International Bar Association, The Hague, 1948. The
same idea, but limited to maritime law cases had already been the subject of a
lecture delivered by him in 1947 to The Anglo-Netherlands Society in London
(published in I, Britain and Holland (1948), 15-25).
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court would be binding in all countries having adhered to its statute.
The decision of the court would in the course of time receive the
authority flowing from its standing and the quality of its judges.
It may be doubted whether in the field of private air law parties
would frequently avail themselves of this opportunity. Under the
present air law conventions persons who have a claim against an aircraft operator or an air carrier are granted the privilege of a favorable
forum or of a choice of fora. They would have little advantage in submitting their claim to an international court of arbitration, the proceedings of which in all probability would not be less if not more costly
than the proceedings in an ordinary court of their choice.
It is worth noting that the scheduled airlines associated in the International Air Transport Association have not yet made any use of the
possibility offered to them under Article 33 of the Warsaw Convention.
This article allows them as far as carriage of goods is concerned to insert
in their Conditions of Carriage an arbitration clause, provided the
place of arbitration would be situated in one of the countries of competent jurisdiction enumerated in Article 28 of the Convention.15
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

Instead of instituting a new Court for the purpose of uniform
interpretation of international private law it is natural that the solution of making use of the experience and authority of the International
Court of Justice has also been advocated. This could be done in two
different ways. Disputes as to interpretation of conventions can be
submitted for decision by the Court, or an advisory opinion thereon
can be requested from the Court.
Clauses granting exclusive jurisdiction to the International Court
of Justice (or to its forerunner the Permanent Court of International
Justice) for the interpretation of private law conventions were adopted
in 1928 (interpretation of the so-called Hague Treaties on international
private law) 16 and in 1948 (interpretation of the Berne Convention on
copyrights) .17 Prewar attempts to adopt a similar provision for the
interpretation of the Paris Convention on the protection of industrial
property failed, largely due to the resistance by the United States which
at that time was not a party to the Statute of the then Permanent Court
of International Justice.
Under article 36 paragraph 2 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice, the States parties to the Statute "may at any time
15 The Conditions of Carriage established in 1938 by the prewar International Air Traffic Association only contained a provision limiting the jurisdiction where actions could be brought. The present IATA conditions of carriage
do not even contain such provision.
16 Protocole pour reconnaitre A la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale ]a Comp6tence d' interpr6ter les Conventions," drawn up at The Hague
Conference of 1928, signed by 17 continental states in 1931 and ratified by
Belgium, Netherlands, Estland, Portugal, Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland. Cf. Gutzwiller in Annuaire Suisse de Droit International 1945 II, p. 71.
17 In the Brussels Conference of 1948 a new Article 27bis to this effect was
inserted in The Berne Convention. Cf. G. Beguin in Annuaire Suisse de Droit
International 1949 (VI) 289-292.
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declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special
agreement, in relation to any other State accepting the same obligation,
the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning the interpretation of a Treaty." Nearly all states which have adhered to the
Statute of the International Court of Justice have accepted the general
jurisdiction of the Court under this provision's which means that any
disputes between these states concerning the interpretation of private
air law treaties such as the Warsaw, Rome and Geneva Conventions, can
already be submitted to the Court.
In 1929 the International Law Institute, following proposals by
its Reporter Mr. Strisower, adopted in New York a resolution by which
it recommended that any dispute as to the interpretation of a treaty
provision-which would pre-suppose that some interpretation had been
given by the legislature or by a final court decision or by an administrative authority of some State-would be submitted for decision to the
Permanent Court of International Justice. The Resolution went
further than the compulsory jurisdiction clauses contained in the
Hague Protocol and the Berne Convention, in that it recommended
that the decision by the Court would bind all Contracting States, parties
to the proposed convention. 19
It seems doubtful to the highest degree whether any State will
ever raise a formal dispute on a mere question of interpretation of
private law conventions dealing with private interests. So far the opportunity existing under the Hague Protocol of 1928, under article 27
bis of the Berne Convention on copyrights and under article 36 of the
Statute of the Court has never been used. The idea that some State
party to the Warsaw Convention might sometime e.g. raise a dispute
with Great Britain on the interpretation of article 1 of that Convention
as adopted by the House of Lords and might submit that dispute to the
International Court, is-obviously sheer illusion. The principle of promoting uniform interpretation by accepting compulsory jurisdiction
of the International Court of Justice may be theoretically correct, but
in practice it simply does not work and therefore must be rejected as a
suitable means to achieve the desired unification.
If the proposal made at the Paris meeting of the "Warsaw SubCommittee" concerning the interpretation by the International Court
of Justice would have aimed at submitting questions of interpretation
to the ordinary jurisdiction of the Court, the statement in the above
cited footnote-"that such provision would have little, if any, value
because it is unlikely that cases arising under this Convention would
become the subject of a dispute between States"-would hold good.
Actually, however, one of the main advantages of the suggested solution was that by making use of the advisory jurisdiction, no formal
disputes between states would be required.
IsYearbook of the International Court of Justice 1950-51.
192.
19 XXXV Annuaire (1929) II, 205.

Leyden, 1951,
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THE COURT'S ADVISORY JURISDICTION

This brings us to the real object of this article: the possibility of
promoting uniform interpretation by way of advisory opinions of the
International Court of Justice.20 From its birth the Court has possessed
the powers to give advisory opinions. These powers were rooted in
article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations stating that the
Court may also give advisory opinions. 21 When the Permanent Court
of International Justice became the International Court of Justice it
retained its advisory jurisdiction which now is based on article 96 of
the Charter of the United Nations and on articles 65 to 68 of the Statute
of the Court. One most important innovation, however, was adoptednot without discussion-at the instance of the United Kingdom delegates. Whereas under the old Statute of the Court advisory opinions
could only be requested by the Council of the League of Nations,
Article 96 of the United Nations Charter now provides that besides
the General Assembly and the Security Council, the other organs of
the United Nations and specialized agencies-which may at any time
be so authorized by the General Assembly may also make use of the
22
Court's advisory jurisdiction.
Nearly all of the specialized agencies have been granted such rights
under the Agreements with the United Nations'by which they were
constituted as its specialized agencies. The Agreement with the International Civil Aviation Organization which became effective on May 13,
1947 by approval of the Assembly of ICA0 2 3 contains the following
provisions in its Article X:
"(2) The General Assembly of the United Nations authorizes the
ICAO to request advisory opinions of the International Court of
Justice on legal questions arising within the scope of its activities other than questions concerning the mutual relationships of
the ICAO and the United Nations or other specialized agencies.
"(3) Such request may be addressed to the Court by the Assembly
or the Council of the ICAO.
2oThe use of advisory opinions by some International Committee of legal
experts has been suggested at various occasions in relation to the Berne Convention on Copyrights, i.a. by Grilnebaum-Ballin in 1928 at the Rome Conference for the revision of said Convention. Cf. Gidel i.c. (note la) at 266.
21 The French text reads: "la Cour donnera," which would seem to impose
a duty on the Court to give advisory opinions when requested to do so. Cf. the
Memorandum of 1922 by John B. Moore, Judge of the Court, published in Series
D, no. 2, Annex 58a (p. 383) of the Publications of the Permanent Court of
Justice.
22 Article 96 of the Charter reads:

"1. The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question.
"2. Other organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies, which
may at any time be so authorized by the General Assembly, may also request
advisory opinions of the Court on legal questions arising within the scope of

their activities."

The British proposal and the subsequent discussions can be

found in Vol. XII of the Documents of The United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco 1945 (New York/London, 1945 etc.)
pp. 88-90. See also on advisory jurisdiction vol. XIII passim.
23 Cf. Article XXII of the Agreement.
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"(4) When requesting the International Court of Justice to give
an advisory opinion, the ICAO
shall inform the Economic and
24
Social Council of the request."
It would be difficult to maintain that promoting uniform interpretation of the private air law Conventions would not fall within
the scope of the activities of ICAO. This means that ICAO is authorized to request advisory opinions from the Court on any provisions
of the Warsaw or other air law conventions which are subject to
different interpretation.
The organs of ICAO by which such requests are to be addressed
to the Court are the Assembly and the Council. The question might
be raised as to whether requesting advisory opinions of the International Court would fall within the scope of the functions which the
Chicago Convention has assigned to the Council. The enumeration of
functions in articles 54 and 55 of said Conventions could not easily
be construed to include such activity. However, it is submitted that by
approving the Agreement with the United Nations which authorizes
both Assembly and Council of ICAO to approach the International
Court for advisory opinions, the Assembly of ICAO has utilized its
power "to delegate to the Council the powers and authority necessary

or desirable for the discharge of the duties of the Organization."
Thus with the existing legal apparatus, and without any new international Convention or Agreement being required, it is possible already
now to have advisory opinions from a legal body which possesses the
greatest international authority in legal matters.
It is true that the Courts will not be bound to follow the opinions
of the International Court of Justice unless their own national legislation would oblige them to do so. It is one of the essential differences
between the ordinary jurisdiction of the Court and its advisory jurisdiction that the latter is not binding upon the States and therefore still
less upon the national courts. If this difference has been denied or
belittled by some authors25 it was with a view to the Court's opinions
relating to "disputes" ("differends") as distinguished from "legal points"
("points") , a distinction having its roots in Article 14 of the Covenant.
The Court itself during the first ten years of its activity has done much
to reduce the distance between its advisory opinions and its judgments
when dealing with actual disputes between States. In 1927 a Commission appointed by it to report on Article 31 of the Statute stated:
"In reality where there are in fact contending parties, the difference
between contentious cases and advisory cases is only nominal" (italics

supplied) .26
24 The full text of the Agreement can be found in the Yearbook of the

United Nations 1946-47, pp. 741-745.
25 N. Politis in the Official Journal of The League of Nations, Special Suppl.
nr. 65, p. 47. Cf. Ch. de Visscher in 26 Recueil des Cours de 1' Acad6mie de
Droit International (1929) at 23-51.
28 Permanent Court of International Justice. Series E. no. 4, p. 76. Cf. the
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Krylov in the case of the interpretation of
the Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania. Reports I. C. J. 1950,

65 at 107.
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Mr. Justice Hudson has warned against the assimilation of the
ordinary and advisory jurisdiction. Speaking of a statement by Politis
to that effect, he has written in a postwar article: "such statements are
not harmless exaggerations; they may be positively mischievous in their
influence both on the Court and on the popular appreciation of its
contributions. Advisory opinions are precisely what they purport to
be: they are advisory. Not legal advice in the ordinary sense, not views
expressed by counsel for the guidance of clients, but pronouncements
as to the law applicable in given situations formulated "after delibera' 27
tion by the Court.
Though the advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice
consequently are not binding this does not mean that they do not have
great authority. In his recent book on International Law Schwartzenberg goes so far as to say that "for all practical purposes their value as
persuasive authority must be considered as being equal to that of the
Court's judgments." 28 Even if one would hesitate to go that far, it is
safe to agree with Goodrich and Hambro that the advisory opinions of
the International Court of Justice "are not likely to be lightly disregarded; '29 far less likely, in any case, than the judgment of a national
court might be disregarded by the courts of other countries. Indeed,
it is difficult to imagine a national court ignoring an advisory opinion of
the International Court of Justice on the interpretation of some private
air law convention, except where a contrary binding authority on the
point would already happen to exist in that country.
Great persuasive authority, but without a binding force which
would be unpalatable to so many national sensibilities: it is submitted
that more can not be achieved in the present stage of international
development for the purpose of arriving as near as possible at uniform
interpretation of the existing international rules for the unification of
private air law.
There should be no illusion that even this modest approach would
not encounter strong opposition, which psychologically will have- its
roots in the inborn distrust of many lawyers of anything international
in the field of private law. Even in so international a climate as that
of private air law the sovereignty of the national state exercises a power
on the minds which it has long since lost where interests are at stake
affecting infinitely more deeply the sovereignty of the States. Only by
mentioning the words "International Court" one is apt to create an
atmosphere of hostility which-as it is difficult in the present time still
to belittle the value of international approach-will shroud itself in
so-called "realism." It is not so long ago that the majority of men
27 M. 0. Hudson, The Effect of Advisory Opinions of the World Court, 42
American Journal of International Law (1948), 630. See also the very clear
statement of the Court on its advisory jurisdiction in its advisory opinion of
March 30, 1950 (see note 26) at 71.
28 G. Schwartzenberger International Law 2d ed. (London, 1949), II, 487.
29 L. M. Goodrich and E. Hambro, Charter of the United Nations. (Boston,
1949), 487.
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found the idea of starting scheduled air services most unrealistic. How
unrealistic does this kind of realism sound nowl In aviation, more than
anywhere else, today's realism is the joke of tomorrow. This applies also
to the legal aspects of aviation.
POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS

If it is difficult to fight the psychological inhibitions working against
international solutions such as the one proposed here, it is more easy
to answer the practical objections which may be raised against it.
The advisory jurisdiction itself has for a long time been a thorn
in many American eyes. The opposition against it was lead by John
Basset Moore, himself a judge of the Court, who has repeatedly argued
that giving advisory opinion is contrary to the character of the judicial
function. 30 This thesis has been successfully refuted by Mr. Justice
Hudson who has pointed to the numerous examples of advisory jurisdiction exercised by state courts including American and Canadian
3
Courts. 1

Nevertheless the objection was used in 1925 as one of the main
arguments by the isolationists when fighting against the United States
becoming a party to the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice. 2 Whatever one's personal feelings may be on this subject, it is clear that by signing the Charter of the United Nations or
otherwise adhering to the Statute of the International Court of Justice
the States have accepted the advisory jurisdiction of the Court to the
same extent and under the same terms as they accepted its ordinary
jurisdiction, and no local views or prejudices could any longer raise
an obstacle against the use of either of these two activities of the Court
whenever such use could be beneficial.
The objection against the proposed procedure of requesting advisory opinions on the interpretation of private air law Conventions
could be made more specific by pointing to the abstract nature of the
questions involved which by supposition would not necessarily be the
subject of an actual dispute between States. The question of whether
abstract issues may be submitted to the Court for an advisory opinion
has been frequently discussed. 3 In 1922 a proposal to add to the Rules
of the Court a provision to the effect that the Court reserves the right
to refrain from replying to questions which require an advisory opinion
SO Cf. his Memorandum of 1922 in the Publications of the Permanent Court
of International Justice, Series D, No. 2 Annex 58a (at p. 383), also 22 Columbia Law Review (1922) 507. Other opponents against the advisory jurisdiction

of the Court are listed by Hudson in his course for the Acad~mie de Droit
International de la Haye (see following note) at p. 406.
ai Les Avis Consultatifs de la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale,
8 Recueil des Cours de l'Acad~mie de Droit International de la Haye (1925),
341, 382-400.

82D. F. Fleming, The United States and The World Court (New York,

1945), 52-67. See also Ch. de Visscher in 26 Recueil des Cours de 1' Acadmie
de Droit International (1929) at 66-73.
33 Cf. M. 0. Hudson, Permanent Court of International Justice 1920-1942
(New York, 1943), 497.
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on a theoretical case, was rejected. 4 Whatever the Court's rights in
this respect, it can hardly be denied that the interpretation of an
international convention is an appropriate issue to be submitted to the
Court since Article 36 of the Statute itself mentions as the first item
in the so-called "facultative clause" the interpretation of a Treaty.
Now it is clear that the character of a question of interpretation does
not change if it is submitted to the Court in the form of a request for
5
an advisory opinion instead of a formal dispute between two States.8
Therefore, there can be no doubt that questions of interpretation of
air law conventions fall within the advisory jurisdiction of the Court.
This is confirmed by the past history of the Court's activity. Of the
27 advisory opinions delivered by the Court before the war 10 were
not related to existing disputes between States. 6
If the above-quoted footnote to the Draft of a Revised "Warsaw
Convention" gives a correct statement of the reason which prompted
the "Warsaw Sub-Committee" not to insert in its Draft a provision
dealing with the possibility of requesting advisory opinions of the
International Court3 7 it is submitted that that majority must have
been laboring under a misconception as regards the character of
advisory opinions.
Another question which may be raised is whether the International
Court of Justice is an appropriate court to consider problems of private
law. At various occasions the importance of the Court's activity in the
field of private law has been stressed. 88 It has even been said that
where the Statute of the Court speaks of "general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations" as one of the main rules of law to be
applied,89 the general principles of private law are among the most
important of these general principles. 40 Speaking more specifically of
advisory opinions Schwartzenberger has stated that "the request for
an advisory opinion need not be limited to a question of international
law, but may turn upon an issue involving exclusively the interpretation of municipal law." 41
84 Publications of the Permanent Court of Justice Series D, no. 2, at 161
and 308.
8 Cf. The broader statement by President Coolidge in his Annual Message
to Congress of 1925: "Deciding the question involved upon issues submitted for
an advisory opinion does not differ materially from deciding the question involved upon issues submitted by contending parties." (Quoted by D. F. Fleming,
in his note 32 cited work, at p. 55).
86 L. M. Goodrich, Nature of the Advisory Opinions of the Permanent Court
of International Justice. 32 American Journal of International Law (1938),
738 at 744-745.
87 The pertinent phrase reads: "The majority, however, considered that
such a provision would have little, if any, value because it is unlikely that cases
arising under this Convention would become the subject of disputes between
States."
8s A. Hammarskjild, La Cour Permanent de Justice Internationale et le
Drolt Internationale Priv6, in his collected essays jurisdiction internationale,
(Leiden, 1938), 257-282; G. Ripert in 44 Recueil des Cours de ' Acad6mie de
Droit International de la Haye (1933) 565-664.
89
Article 38, para. 1. sub c.
40
Ripert (see note 38) at p. 579.
41 International Law 2d ed. (London, 1949) II, 481.
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It is interesting to note in this connection that the past career of
many of the judges of the Court points to a thorough experience in
matters of private law, either as judges or as professors of civil law or
as authors of treatises on questions of private law. It would indeed be
difficult to hold that the judges of the national courts would be in a
better position or more able to construe the air law conventions than
are the judges of the International Court, with their vast international
experience, their unbiased state of mind, and with the excellent library
of the Court and of the Peace Palace at their disposal, offering one of
the most complete collections of comparative law. Some experiences
with decisions of national courts construing the Warsaw Convention
seem to prove at least that the ability of the national courts does not
offer such safeguards against doubtful interpretations that an experiment with the International Court of Justice would not be warranted.
As had been pointed out before, the'jurisdiction of the Court for the
interpretation of private law conventions has been accepted at various
occasions by the States and nobody has ever denied the Court's competence in this respect.
Is there any danger - and this would be a more practical objection
- that by submitting from time to time questions of interpretation of
private air law conventions to the Court, the Court's docket would be
too heavily burdened? This question has been strongly denied by the
Legal Advisor of the International Labour Office in his plea for a more
liberal use of the advisory jurisdiction of the Court by the specialized
agencies of the United Nations. 42 Fear for overburdening of the courts,
moreover, is seldom a sound argument when the advancement of
justice is involved.
In order to alleviate the additional task which would be imposed
upon the Court when the procedure here proposed were to be adopted,
the Court might consider the possibility of applying Article 26 of the
Statute. Under this Article "the Court may from time to time form
one or more chambers, composed of three or more judges for dealing
with particular categories of cases; for example, labor cases and cases
relating to transport and communications."
It is true that in order to have an air law chamber functioning for
the purpose here suggested, the Court would have to adopt an amendment to its present Rules which provide that advisory opinions are to
be given by the full Court.48 However, the Court is empowered to
42 C. W. Jenks, Status of International Organizations in Relation to the
International Court of Justice 82 Transactions of the Grotius Society for 1946
(1947), 1-42, at 16.
43 Rule 84: "Advisory opinions shall be given after deliberation by the full
Court, etc."
(It is to be noted that the text offered in the publications of the International Court of Justice Series D, no. 1 leaves out the word "full," whereas the
French text has retained the words "en s~ance plni~re"). The requirement of a
full court for advisory opinions was adopted in 1922 (Publications of the Permanent Court of Justice, Series D, No. 2 at p. 98) not without some discussion
(1.c. at p. 895). The requirement was defended by Mr. Justice D. Negulesco on
the ground that otherwise not all legal systems would be necessarily represented
(l.c., at 476).
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change its own Rules at any time it deems fit.4 4 It is believed that the
creation of a Chamber on Air Law could be an important step forward
in the international development of private air law.
One real difficulty should yet be considered. There are still a
number of States which are not party to the Statute of the International
Court of Justice, but which have signed and ratified the Warsaw Convention. 45 The list of States which are members of the International
Civil Aviation Organization without having adhered to the Statute is
even greater. 46 Could these States reasonably be supposed to support a
scheme, based on the assumed authority of a Court which they have
47
not recognized?
Before giving an answer to this question two things should be kept
in mind. In the first place it is the essence of the proposed procedure
that no States will be bound by the advisory opinions of the International Court; not the States which are party to the Statute, and still
less the States which have not adhered to it. The opinions being advisory the States are free to grant them as much authority as they deem
appropriate.
In the second place the reason why States do or do not adhere to
the Statute of the International Court is chiefly of a political character;
it is largely due to the last war that a number of the States, party to
the Warsaw or Chicago Convention, still have not yet adhered to the
Statute of the International Court of Justice. The question of the
uniform interpretation of private law conventions has little, if anything,
to do with such political considerations. By agreeing to the International Court of Justice playing some part in the uniform development
of international private law, a State would not prejudice its position as
to the Court's jurisdiction with respect to the legal relations between
States.
Nevertheless the "Warsaw Sub-Committee" which met in Paris
in January 1952 feared that by inserting a reference to the International
Court of Justice in its Draft the acceptability of the new text for those
States which are not party to the Statute of the International Court of
Justice might be endangered. 48 It was also pointed out that the provision was not necessary in order to follow the suggested procedure.
It is difficult to deny the strength of this argument. Thesole purpose
served by having an express reference to the International Court in
Cf. Article 30 of the Statute.
45 The following States having ratified the Warsaw Convention are not a
party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice: Bulgaria, Germany,
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Rumania and Spain. Neither are Austria
and Japan which signed but did not ratify the Warsaw Convention.
46 The following States listed in March 15, 1951 by the U. S. Department of
State as parties to the Chicago Convention are not a party to the Statute of
the Court: Austria, Ceylon, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Portugal and Spain.
47 The difficulty is more serious where the interpretation of a multilateral
convention is subjected to the ordinary jurisdiction of the Court. Cf. Gidel
(note 2) at 281-283.
48 If the author's personal recollections are correct this was the reason
why the Sub-Committee decided not to adopt the proposed paragraph which
44

would have referred to the advisory jurisdiction of the Court.
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the Warsaw and other private law conventions would be to reinforce
the influence of the Court's advisory opinions on the uniform interpretation of private air law. It must be seriously doubted, indeed,
whether this advantage would not be outweighed by the disadvantage
of the new text becoming less acceptable to a number of States.
Having dealt with the various objections which may be raised
against the proposed procedure it is time to come now to a more positive discussion of it. The following suggestions are made in a tentative
way and are subject to modifications without the central idea being
affected thereby.
This central idea could be thus summarized: On the one hand
there exists an undeniable need for uniform interpretation of the private law conventions in order to let them have a unifying effect which
does not only exist on paper. On the other hand we possess already in
the present stage of international development an apparatus consisting
of (1) a standing committee of experts in air law representing the views
of the different countries and legal systems as to problems of air law:
the Legal Committee of ICAO; (2) an international body which is
able to judge on the political, economic or technical questions involved
in the interpretation of the private air law conventions; and finally
(3) an international court of recognized authority.
The international rules of law necessary to make use of this apparatus for the sake of promoting the desired uniform interpretation
are also ready without any new agreement or convention being required. Once admitted that advisory opinions by the International
Court of Justice on private air law provisions which lend themselves
to double interpretation would at least to a certain extent advance the
uniform interpretation of such provisions, the conclusion seems inescapable that the international bodies which are created "to promote
the development of all aspects of international civil aeronautics" would
fall short in their duties if they fail to make use of all means which
are offered to them for the performance of this task.
SELECTION OF QUESTIONS

The first step to be taken would be for the Legal Committee of
ICAO to consider-subject to approval by the Council-which questions
of interpretation are appropriate to be submitted to the International
Court of Justice for an advisory opinion. Not all problems discussed
in textbooks or law reviews are of a nature that a request for an advisory opinion would be warranted. The International Court of Justice
is not an academic institute and it should not be worried with theoretical problems which either do not arise in practice or else do not offer
an actual danger of multiple interpretation. "It is fortunate that the
twelve requests for advisory opinions which so far have been made
did not present an hypothetical or abstract character and were related
to actual problems requiring an immediate and practical solution. The
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Court has not been made the professor of the Council. No legal problems of the future have been submitted to it, only current problems." 49
The following questions deserve consideration when the Legal
Committee will have to decide upon the conditions which are to be
fulfilled in order that a problem of interpretation may be deemed
appropriate for submission to the Court:
1. Will it be necessary that there be disagreement between two or more
states as to the correct interpretation of some provision.of one of the private
air law conventions? The answer, obviously should be "yes" in a sense that
where there exists unanimous agreement, the presumed problem is not an
actual "problem." However, the fact of all members of the Legal Committee
being of one mind on a certain issue does not offer such general agreement
as to insure uniform interpretation. In fact, where the unanimous opinion
would go against the decision rendered by some national court, it would
rather point to a great probability of future court decisions going against
the one previously rendered. So much can be said, however, that where
the unanimous opinion of the Legal Committee is in conformance with the
only decision or decisions rendered on the point, if any, there is no reason
for submitting the question to the International Court of Justice.
2. Should it be a prerequisite that the questions to be submitted to the
International Court must have been the subject of a judgment of some
national Court? The problem is a difficult one. It certainly would be a
gross simplification to say that the lack of a court decision proves that the
question has no actual importance. This may be illustrated by an example
taken from that most frequently applied air law convention, the Warsaw
Convention. Article 22, which itself is among the most frequently invoked
provisions of this Convention, limits the Carrier's liability for lost or damaged baggage or freight to 250 French gold francs per kilogram. To my
knowledge there does not yet exist one court decision as to how this rule
has to be construed in case of partial loss or damage. Three answers are
possible:
(1) the limit should be calculated on the basis of the weight of the
entire shipment (or all baggage carried under one baggage check
respectively), or
(2) the limit should be calculated on the basis of the weight of that
piece of freight or baggage in which the loss or damage occured, or
(3) the limit should be calculated on the basis of the weight of the lost
or damaged article itself. 50
It is evident that the amount of compensation will greatly depend upon the
answer to be given to this question. There does not even seem to exist a
uniform practice among the largest airlines. Here is clearly a situation
where an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice would be
49 M.

0. Hudson in 8 ReCueil des Cours (1925), 341 at 409 (in French).

50 The "Warsaw" Sub-Committee has chosen the second solution in its Draft

of January 1952. Article 15, para. 4 of this Draft reads as follows: "For all
claims arising from the loss of, damage to or delay of registered baggage or
cargo, the liability of the carrier shall be limited to a maximum sum represent-

ing (250) francs per kilogram of the gross weight of such piece or pieces of the
registered baggage or cargo as are actually lost, damaged or delayed; provided

that, where the loss or damage of one piece of registered baggage or cargo affects
the value of other pieces included in the same baggage check or airway bill, the
gross weight of such pieces shall also be taken into account for determining
the limits of liability."
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most useful in promoting uniform interpretation of a provision which is so
vitally important to both the air carriers and their customers.
It is, therefore, suggested that it would be unwise to exclude formally
all issues which have not been the subject of a court decision. This does
not mean, of course, that the Legal Committee should not be very careful
in accepting questions for submission to the International Court which
would not meet the "actuality test" of having been already the issue of
some litigation.
3. If, contrary to this suggestion, the foregoing question were to be
answered in the affirmative (i.e., that there should exist already one or
more judgments of national courts on the issue), another question arises:
should the required judgment have to meet certain conditions e.g., that it
was delivered by a Court of a Contracting State, or that it was a judgment
of the highest court in the State, or that the judgment was final according
to the law of the country where it was rendered.
It is clear that the argument offered above against requiring some previous judgment of a national court, applies more strongly if one would
require moreover that such judgment should meet certain conditions.
4. The most extreme condition would be to require two contradictory
decisions rendered previously by two courts of Contracting States on the
same question of interpretation.
5. Should there be a limitation ratione materiae of the questions to be
submitted to the Court?
No general rule separating the important from the unimportant
issues Would seem possible except that preference should be given to
the interpretation of such provisions which are more frequently applied.
This means that questions of interpretation of the Warsaw Convention
generally should have preference over questions of interpretation of
the other private air law conventions.
In view of the purpose of the proposed procedures which is not to
get advisory opinions on specific cases but rather to promote the uniform interpretation of provisions which lend themselves to various
interpretations, no questions should be submitted to the Court which
are so tied with the facts of each specific case that it would be asking
the impossible to request an opinion in abstracto. This would exclude,
for example, the request for an advisory opinion as to the meaning of
"wilful misconduct" as used in Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention.
General opponents of the system of advisory opinions might say
that questions of interpretation of legal texts are always too closely connected with the facts to which they are to be applied that an opinion
on a question of interpretation in abstracto can never be given. This
absolute and rather dogmatic point of view is refuted by the facts.
A few examples taken from the Warsaw Convention may suffice. The
question of whether the words "High Contracting Party" in Article I
of the Convention should be taken to include those Signatory States
which did not ratify the Convention has nothing to do with the facts
of the individual cases, nor has the question of how the limit of the
carrier's liability for lost or damaged baggage or freight should be computed under Article 22 of the Convention.
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SUGGESTED PROCEDURE

On the basis of the foregoing observations the following pyocedure
is tentatively suggested. Either the Council of ICAO or any Member
State may propose to the Legal Committee that a question of interpretation be considered for submission to the International Court of Justice.
Proposals of States which are party to one of the air law conventions
without being a member of ICAO should be addressed to the Council.
Any such proposals should be circularized well in advance of the
meeting of the Legal Committee at which they will be discussed, so
that the States will have sufficient time to send in their remarks and
the Legal Bureau of ICAO will have time to prepare a comment.
Discussion of all proposals made, if any, should be a standing item on
the agenda of the Legal Committee. The normal rules of procedure
of the Legal Committee should apply. This means that in order to be
discussed the proposal should be supported by at least one other represented State.
At this stage the Legal Committee can do one of three things. It
may reject the proposal, either because it holds the question involved
to be not of a controversial nature, or because it finds that the question
has no actual importance, or because the question is too much connected with the facts of the individual cases. If it rejects the proposal
on the first ground, the Committee should clearly indicate its unanimous opinion as to the correct interpretation of the provision concerned. If the proposal is not rejected, the Committee can at once
decide that the Council will be asked to request an advisory opinion
thereon. In this case it will appoint a person who on behalf of the
Committee, and assisted by the Legal Bureau, will give such explanations as may be asked by the Council.
Finally the Committee may decide that the question be referred
first to a Reporter, who will investigate all aspects involved and who
will report and advise on it at the following Session of the Legal Committee. The Legal Committee can then take its final decision as to
the desirability of submitting the question to the International Court
of Justice. As has already been pointed out, the Legal Committee itself
has no power to request advisory opinions of the Court. Such requests
should be made by the Assembly or by the Council of ICAO. Obviously
the Assembly is not an appropriate body to take a decision on the
technical legal questions which would be involved. This does not mean
that the Council could not find it desirable to have a decision of the
Assembly as to the principle of requesting advisory opinions on these
matters of interpretation. But once the Assembly has expressed its
general agreement with the procedure, it should be left to the Council
whether any specific request should be passed on to the Court.
The Council will have to show the greatest restraint in exercising
its discretionary powers in these matters. It is difficult to see how-the
principle of the suggested procedure having been accepted-specific
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questions of interpretation of the existing private air law conventions
could be so complicated by political or economic aspects that the legal
interest of uniform interpretation might be overshadowed thereby.
The tentative character of the procedure as worked out above is
once more emphasized. The main reason for concluding these remarks
by the outline of a procedure, is to make it very clear that by accepting
the general idea advocated in this article, one would in no way make
the International Court of Justice an academic forum for all kinds
of theoretical legal questions. It would be the task of the Legal Committee to prevent other problems of interpretation than those having
an actual and practical interest, from going to the Court.
It is respectfully submitted that the Legal Committee and the
Council of ICAO should thoroughly consider the possibility of promoting uniform interpretation of international air law conventions,
which has been discussed here. The importarce of interpretation for
the unification of air law cannot be overestimated. In fact it might be
argued with good reasons that a clear and uniform interpretation of
the existing Warsaw Convention is even of greater practical interest
to civil aviation than the drafting of new conventions which takes so
much of the present time of the Legal Committee.
UNIFORM INTERPRETATION

AND REVISION

When Major K. M. Beaumont in his Report to the Legal Committee
of February 28, 1951, 51 stated his case for an entirely new convention
on the air carrier's liability to replace the present Warsaw Convention,
he listed all points where in his opinion the present Convention is
deficient, arguing that it would have no sense to introduce such a long
list of amendments by way of a Protocol.
It is interesting to note that the majority of points raised by him
involve questions where the language of the Convention is ambiguous
or at least open to more than one interpretation, all points, therefore,
where a uniform interpretation established ,by a well advised Court
of recognized authority would take away most of the need for revision.
The Legal Committee has now already devoted two or three meetings
and one meeting of a Sub-Committee to the revision of the Warsaw
Convention, with other meetings still to follow. The practical results
of this work-accepting an optimistic estimate-will not be seen before
1960, when the new Convention, assuming that it will be adopted, may
have been ratified by a sufficient number of States. There is no reason
to be discouraged by this. Everybody familiar with international private
law conventions knows that the mills of international legislation grind
slowly. But if it is true that part of the deficiencies spotted by those who
fight for a full scale revision could be cured in less time and with no
risk of endangering wide acceptance of the Convention, it would be regrettable if the Legal Committee and the Council of ICAO should fail
to grasp the opportunity offered to them by the present state of interna51
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tional organization, while pursuing its work on the drafting of a new
Convention. It may bear repetition that such a new Convention in the
course of time will show other deficiencies and ambiguities, probably
even before it became effective. The need for uniform interpretation
will remain.
In a Resolution of November 14, 1947 the General Assembly of
the United Nations "considering that it is a responsibility of the United
Nations to encourage the progressive development of international
law" and "that the International Court of Justice is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations," has recommended "that organs of
the United Nations and the specialized agencies should from time to
time review the difficult and important points of law within the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice which have arisen in the
course of their activities and involve questions of principle which it is
desirable to have settled and should refer them to the International
Court of Justice for an advisory opinion.

'

52

It is true that some of the "considerations" of this Resolution seem
to indicate that the General Assembly most probably was primarily
thinking of questions of international public law, but the Recommendation itself is worded in general terms and hardly allows a restrictive
interpretation. It is suggested that this clear advice of the supreme
organ of world cooperation should not be lightly set aside by those
entrusted with international cooperation in the legal field.
2 United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records of the Second Session, Resolutions, Doc. A/519, p. 103.

